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Abstract—In the deregulated electrical energy market, network
operators have to provide market participants with appropriate
incentives to guarantee stable operation of the power grid. We
demonstrate that the current synchronous energy-based market
and incentive system do not necessarily induce power exchange
proﬁles that contribute to grid stability and security of supply.
State-of-the-art solutions for tackling the inconsistency between
energy-based market mechanisms and power-related balancing
objectives can decrease freedom of trade or increase market
complexity. This paper provides an alternative scheduling concept
as a means to overcome this issue, which relies on asynchronous
settlement of energy transactions. We show that in this way, grid
operation can become more robust and the strain on balancing
reserves can be reduced considerably.
Index Terms—Deregulated electrical energy markets, power
generation dispatch, power system control
I. INTRODUCTION
AN important prerequisite for reliable operation of theelectricity grid is that power supply and demand are
balanced all the time, as efﬁcient methods for storing large
quantities of electrical energy are scarce. Before liberalization
of the electricity market, the electrical energy and power
balance was controlled in a rather straightforward way, as a
small group of operators had direct control over generation.
A large part of the energy production could efﬁciently be
scheduled to minimize the expected imbalance with respect
to the rather well-predictable load, whereas simple classical
feedback control techniques sufﬁced for compensating the
relatively small amount of unforeseen imbalance ﬂuctuations
during the operational day.
Today, this situation has changed drastically. In the dereg-
ulated European electricity system, generators are owned and
controlled by multiple market actors that compete for supply
and demand of energy under the supervision of a publicly-
regulated Transmission System Operator (TSO). The TSO is
responsible for the electrical transmission infrastructure and
thus for preserving the real-time power balance. It should
achieve this by providing Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs)
with such incentives that rational, i.e., proﬁt-driven, behavior
on their side leads to reliable operation of the network, see,
e.g., [1].
Since the main electricity market commodity is energy
rather than power (which is a ﬂow variable of undeﬁned
economical value), the TSO can only provide energy-based
ﬁnancial incentives, even though control objectives actually
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require balancing of power. Moreover, because energy trans-
actions are deﬁned with respect to ﬁxed-length time slots
or Program Time Units (PTUs), the market and TSO can
only settle energy imbalances at a limited number of discrete
time instants. Recent studies show that already today, the
inconsistency between periodic energy-based settlement on
one hand and power-related stability requirements on the other
is causing severe frequency deviations in the European power
network, particularly at PTU boundaries, see [2]–[4].
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we ana-
lyze the fundamental ﬂaws of the current European market
arrangements with respect to grid stability and balancing
goals, in particular, by recalling the strong dependency be-
tween market-induced generation set-point interchanges and
power imbalance ﬂuctuations at PTU boundaries. Secondly,
a method is proposed to loosen the coupling between the
incentive/market layer and the physical network layer as a
solution to these issues. This method relies on an asynchronous
energy transaction settlement system that yields a short, virtual
PTU length on the overall, aggregated network level, whereas
the PTU length observed by individual market actors is not
affected. This enables the TSO to decrease the expected open-
loop power imbalance, as energy supply and demand expec-
tations acquired during the scheduling/dispatch phase can be
used more efﬁciently during network operation, with minor
consequences for trade complexity and market freedom. Open-
and closed-loop simulation results are provided to compare
the performance of the proposed asynchronous settlement
concept with that of state-of-the-art approaches. We ﬁnish with
conclusions.
Nomenclature: Power [MW] and energy [MWh] can both
be positive or negative; they are either delivered (> 0) or
withdrawn (< 0) from the grid. Let N,N+,R and R+ denote
the ﬁeld of integers {. . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . .}, the set of strictly
positive integers {1, 2, . . .} and the set of real and nonnegative
real numbers, respectively. For every c ∈ R, let |c| denote
its absolute value and let c = max{k ∈ N | k ≤ c}. The
ﬁrst and second order derivatives of some continuous function
f : R→ R are denoted by f ′ and f ′′, respectively.
II. INCONSISTENCY OF
MARKET ARRANGEMENTS AND BALANCING OBJECTIVES
So far, the present market and transaction-settlement ar-
rangements have proven to be reasonably adequate for en-
suring balanced and stable operation of the European power
system, see, for example, [5]. However, it is possible to
show that the present way of dealing with uncertainty during
forward trading is neither consistent, nor well-suited for the
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2challenges that power networks face in the future, such as
the increased extent of ﬂuctuations in power supply due to
renewable sources.
One of the objectives of forward trading/scheduling is to
guarantee that for each PTU, production and consumption are
expected to be balanced. Since energy, rather than power, is
traded on the electricity market, the market condition for open-
loop balance is formulated in terms of energy, i.e.,∑
i=0,...,N−1 Ei[n] = 0, n ∈ N, (1)
where Ei[n] [MWh] denotes the nett energy transaction of
balance responsible party i ∈ IBRP := {0, 1, . . . , N−1} during
the n-th PTU.
Let the controllable and uncontrollable power prosump-
tion (production/consumption) of BRP i at time t ∈ R be
denoted by Pi(t) [MW] and μP,i(t) [MW], respectively. To
comply with the ahead-established market transactions (and
thus, to avoid imbalance costs), BRPs can track any power
proﬁle Pi(t) that satisﬁes Ei[n] =
∫
PTU n
{
Pi(t)+μP,i(t)
}
dt.
However, for BRPs with strictly convex power prosumption
costs, the most proﬁtable way to supply a certain amount of
energy is to keep controllable power prosumption constant;
see, e.g., [6]. These BRPs therefore attempt to generate the
step-wise averaged power proﬁles
P˜i(t) = P˜i[n], for t ∈ [tn, tn+1) (2)
where
P˜i[n] :=
1
TPTU
(
Ei[n]−
∫ tn+1
tn
μP,i(t)dt
)
,
and where TPTU [s] denotes the PTU-length and tn := nTPTU,
n ∈ N. Now suppose that BRPs are able to track P˜i(t) exactly,
and let μP,i(t) be piecewise constant with changes at tn. This
is depicted on the left-hand side of Fig. 1, which shows the
total power generation P (t) :=
∑
i Pi(t) = P˜ (t) :=
∑
i P˜i(t),
the total noncontrollable prosumption μP (t) :=
∑
i μP,i(t)
and their sum, i.e., the open-loop aggregated power imbalance
ΔPOL(t) := P (t) + μP (t). (3)
In this ideal case, open-loop energy balance condition (1)
coincides with an open-loop power balance (ΔPOL = 0
for all t ∈ R). However, in reality, power demand proﬁles
will never be step-wise; they are smooth due to generator
inertia and other physical restrictions. This is schematically
illustrated in the right-hand side of Fig. 1, which shows that
in practice, ΔPOL(t) is nonzero and especially large at set-
point interchange instants tn, i.e, at PTU boundaries. Thus,
although the present market and incentive system complies
with requirement (1) for open-loop energy balance (at discrete
time instants tn), it introduces large open-loop mismatches in
terms of power, which need to be compensated by considerable
control effort in real-time, even if no external disturbances act
on the system.
Note that the effects caused by the above described in-
consistency are already observable today. Fig. 2 shows a
frequency measurement performed in the European/ENTSO-E
synchronous grid during the evening, see [7]. Note that directly
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Fig. 1. Open-loop power imbalance for step-wise/smooth exchange proﬁles.
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Fig. 2. Grid frequency measurement, reproduced from [7].
after a change in energy exchange set-points, which occurs
every full hour, large frequency deviations occur. These de-
viations due to step-wise power reference tracking activate a
signiﬁcant share of primary and secondary control (PC/SC)
reserves, such that the system becomes vulnerable to distur-
bances, see [2]–[4].
A. State-of-the-art solutions
Because the above explained power imbalance ﬂuctuations
are expected to increase in the near future, e.g., due to
the growth of energy trading volumes and the large-scale
integration of renewable sources, a number of solutions have
been proposed in the literature, see, for example, [2], [3].
These approaches are brieﬂy discussed below.
1) Explicit constraints on power: A natural way to decrease
the open-loop power imbalance is to put an upper bound on
the ramp rates of Pi(t), see [2]. This constraint (on power
instead of energy) prevents large step-wise changes in P (t)
at PTU boundaries, such that intra-PTU power imbalances
can be decreased effectively. However, due to the integral
relation of power and energy, this simultaneously limits market
activity, and the implementation of power-based incentives and
veriﬁcation of the associated conditions is difﬁcult.
2) Shorter PTUs: Shorter PTUs generally lead to smaller
average differences in the amounts of energy exchanged
during subsequent PTUs. In accordance with (2), this results
in decreased step-wise changes at PTU boundaries, see [3].
However, as energy transactions are settled on a PTU basis, a
decrease in PTU length will increase the number of transac-
tions correspondingly. This will increase scheduling and trade
complexity. Moreover, it is difﬁcult for BRPs to respond to
portfolio deviations (and, correspondingly, to avoid imbalance
costs) within short PTUs during the operational day. As a
consequence, the support for decreasing the PTU length may
be low, particularly amongst BRPs.
III. ASYNCHRONOUS PROGRAM TIME UNITS
To the best of our knowledge, decreasing the PTU length is
the only state-of-the-art solution that can tackle the fundamen-
tal ﬂaw of the current (forward) balancing arrangements, i.e.,
3the inconsistency between energy-based trade and power-based
balancing requirements. However, the increase of market com-
plexity associated with straightforwardly shortening the PTU
length renders this solution unsuited for implementation. In
this section we show that it is still possible to increase the PTU
lattice density, and hence, open-loop balancing performance,
without affecting forward trade, by adopting an asynchronous
settlement method.
Let M ≤ N partitions or time frames Pj , j = 0, . . . ,M−1,
of the continuous-time axis T = R be given such that
T = {. . . ,Tj [−1],Tj [0],Tj [1], . . .}, (4)
with partition blocks (or time-shifted PTUs)
Tj [n] :=
[
(ϕj + n)TPTU, (ϕj + n + 1)TPTU
)
, (5)
for n ∈ N, where ϕj := (1+2j)2M . Each partition Pj is assigned
to a nonempty set of BRPs Ij ⊆ IBRP, with Ij constructed
in such a way that
⋃
j=0,...,M−1 Ij = IBRP and Ij
⋂ Il = ∅
whenever j 	= l, j, l ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}. Next, consider the
following algorithm.
Algorithm III.1 (Asynchronous PTU Method (APM))
1) Trade: Each BRP i ∈ IBRP submits its TPTU-based E-
programs/transactions Ei[n] for the upcoming day to the TSO,
who performs a consistency check according to (1).
2) Scheduling: Given a set of consistent transactions Ei[n],
i ∈ IBRP, the TSO reschedules them to obtain E-references
that are deﬁned with respect to the time frames Pj . That is, it
expects BRP i ∈ Ij to exchange a nett amount of energy with
the grid in time interval Tj [n] of
Eˆi[n] := (1− ϕj)Ei[n] + ϕjEi[n + 1]. (6)
3) Settlement: Any deviations from Eˆi[n] within Tj [n] are
settled in a fashion that is similar to the present arrangements,
except for the different PTUs used per group of BRPs Ij . 
The novelty of Alg. III.1 completely lies in the schedul-
ing and settlement step. Thus, even though APM employs
asynchronous settlement of energy transactions, energy trade
itself is still based on standard, synchronized PTU intervals
[tn, tn+1). Hence, BRPs may establish transactions with any
other market actor, regardless of their respective time frames
during the operational day. Also, note that the E-references Eˆi
are dependent on the synchronous E-programs Ei only, such
that no prosumption is shifted from one BRP to an other.
Remark III.2 The time shifts employed by APM, i.e.,
ϕjTPTU =
(1+2j)
2M TPTU, are nonzero for all j = 0, . . . ,M − 1.
This avoids possible competitive advantages arising from
market-synchronized settlement. 
In what follows, it is assumed that production costs are
strictly convex functions of power prosumption, and all BRPs
respond to incentives in a rational, cost-minimizing fashion.
These assumptions are widely used in power system eco-
nomics, see [8]. Moreover, for simplicity, let M = N and
P˜ (t),
Pˆ (t)
Pˆ0(t)
Pˆ1(t)
}
Tˆ[0] Tˆ[1]
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Fig. 3. Controllable power prosumption under APM, for M = N = 2.
Ij := {j}, such that the energy transactions of BRP i are
settled with respect to time frame Pi. Then, (6) reduces to
Eˆi[n] := (1− ϕi)Ei[n] + ϕiEi[n + 1]. (7)
Now consider the following proposition.
Proposition III.3 Rescheduling of energy prosumption ac-
cording to (6) does not affect the nett energy exchange for the
network as a whole. 
Prop. III.3 is derived as follows. Consider a sequence of
PTUs n = 0 . . . ,K − 1, for which the total energy exchange
of BRP i under synchronous/asynchronous scheduling satisﬁes∑K−1
n=0 Ei[n] =
∑K−1
n=0 ϕiEi[n] + (1− ϕi)Ei[n],∑K−1
n=0 Eˆi[n] =
∑K−1
n=0 (1− ϕi)Ei[n] + ϕiEi[n + 1].
Thus, the nett difference in energy exchange is given by
ΔEi(K) :=
K−1∑
n=0
Ei[n]− Eˆi[n] = ϕi(Ei[0]− Ei[K]).
In practice, the sequence of energy transactions will be highly
periodic (e.g., over a day or a year). Hence, it follows that,
for appropriate K∗, Ei[0] ≈ Ei[K∗] and thus ΔEi(K∗) ≈ 0.
Moreover, in accordance with (6), all transactions Ei[n] are
distributed over a period
[
(ϕi+n−1)TPTU, (ϕi+n+1)TPTU
)
of length 2TPTU. Note that this interval includes the PTU that
was used for establishing Ei[n], i.e.,
[
mTPTU, (n + 1)TPTU
)
.
Since no transactions are shifted from one BRP to another,
equivalence of total BRP energy exchange yields equivalence
of total aggregated energy exchange, and Prop. III.3 follows.
Next, we recall that under APM, the controllable generators
of rational BRPs will track step-wise power proﬁles Pˆi(t) =
Pˆi[n] for t ∈ Ti[n], with
Pˆi[n] :=
1
TPTU
(
Eˆi[n]−
∫
t∈Ti[n]
μP,i(t)dt
)
, (8)
to comply with E-reference-based portfolios in a similar way
as BRPs comply with E-programs under the present scheduling
arrangements, due to strict convexity of the prosumption costs.
The resulting controllable power exchange proﬁle for the
network as a whole, i.e., the aggregation of individual time-
shifted step-wise power proﬁles, is given by
Pˆ (t) = Pˆ [k] :=
N−1∑
i=0
Pˆi
[⌊
k − i
N
⌋]
for t ∈ Tˆ[k], (9)
4where Tˆ[k] :=
[
1+2k
2N TPTU,
1+2(k+1)
2N TPTU
)
. Fig. 3 illustrates
this aggregation for N = 2. Note that even though the pro-
sumption proﬁles of individual BRPs are piecewise constant
with steps of length TPTU, the corresponding nett prosumption
on the aggregated system level is less coarse with steps
of length TPTUN . Hence, in contrast to standard, synchronized
scheduling, APM can induce an aggregated controlled power
exchange proﬁle that captures the smooth dynamics of μP (t)
well and yields low open-loop imbalance, at any time instant
t ∈ R, in terms of both energy and power. The effectiveness
of APM is dependent on the distribution of energy transactions
over the individual BRPs, however. In what follows, we will
describe two extreme scenarios to illustrate this dependency.
Firstly, suppose that BRP 0 is responsible for all control-
lable prosumption in the network. Accordingly, the aggregated
controllable power prosumption Pˆ (t) = Pˆ0(t) = Pˆ0[n] for
t ∈ [(ϕ0 + n)TPTU, (ϕ0 + n + 1)TPTU) is step-wise with step
width TPTU, both under the present arrangements and under
APM. Thus, in this case, APM does not improve open-loop
balancing performance.
Next, consider a second scenario where the controllable
energy prosumption is uniformly distributed over the BRPs
i = 0, . . . , N − 1, and let BRP 0 be responsible for all
noncontrollable prosumption (i.e., μP,i(t) 	= 0 only for i = 0).
Hence, TPTUP˜i[n] = − 1N
∫ tn+1
tn
μP,0(t)dt for all i ∈ IBRP.
Moreover, suppose that∫
t∈T0[n]
μP (t)dt = (1− ϕ0)
∫ tn+1
tn
μP (t)dt + ϕ0
∫ tn+2
tn+1
μP (t)dt.
It follows from (7)–(9) that
Pˆ [k] =
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
(1− ϕi)P˜
[⌊
k − i
N
⌋]
+ ϕiP˜
[⌊
k − i
N
⌋
+ 1
]
, (10)
which is a weighted sum of time-shifted economically optimal
prosumption proﬁles for the present, synchronous settlement
arrangements. From (10) it follows that in this second scenario,
the aggregated controllable power production proﬁle is step-
wise with a step width of TPTUN . Moreover, in Appendix A it is
shown that (10) is equivalent to convolving (2) with a digital
low-pass ﬁnite-impulse response ﬁlter. This ﬁlter is speciﬁed
by the coefﬁcient vector/impulse response
h =
[
h0, h1, . . . hN−1, hN , . . . h2N−2, h2N−1
]
=
1
2N2
[ 1, 1+2, ... 1+2(N−1), 1+2(N−1), ... 1+2, 1 ] . (11)
The low-pass character of APM ensures a smooth adjustment
of controllable generation on the aggregated power system
level. Instead of interchanging controllable prosumption set-
points simultaneously at market-PTU boundaries, BRPs will
adjust their production at different time instances, thus effec-
tively tackling the issues discussed in Sect. II.
Although, intuitively, the smoothing/de-synchronizing effect
is expected to be optimal for evenly distributed controllable
prosumption capacity, APM will improve the open-loop bal-
ancing performance as long as the controllable load/generation
is rescheduled over more than one time frame Pi. This
observation is formalized as follows.
Proposition III.4 APM provides BRPs with an incentive for
delivering power in such a way that the aggregated dispatch
proﬁle yields an open-loop power imbalance that is at most as
large as, but (under normal operating conditions) most likely
less than the imbalance attained by a synchronous method with
identical PTU length. 
The details on deriving Prop. III.4 are provided in Ap-
pendix B; below, we list the main results only.
The worst-case upper bound on the open-loop power mis-
match attained by APM is∣∣∣∣ΔPOL(t)∣∣N=1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ TPTU2
∣∣∣∣μ′P (t)∣∣∣∣+ T 2PTU6
∣∣∣∣μ′′P (t)∣∣∣∣+O(T 3PTU), (12)
see Appendix B. As explained above, this bound applies to the
current, synchronous settlement arrangements, or, equivalently,
to APM with N = 1/with all controllable energy prosumption
concentrated in one sequence. The best-case upper bound on
the open-loop imbalance, as obtained for uniform distribution
of controllable exchange and N →∞, is∣∣∣∣ΔPOL(t)∣∣N→∞
∣∣∣∣ ≤ T 2PTU6
∣∣∣∣μ′′P (t)∣∣∣∣+O(T 3PTU). (13)
From (12) and (13) follows that APM gives an approximation
of the actual noncontrollable power prosumption proﬁle that
is at least as accurate as the proﬁle induced by synchronous
arrangements, which supports Prop. III.4.
Remark III.5 Prop. III.4 shows that a balanced distribution of
controllable generation/load over the time frames Pj is crucial
for optimizing APM’s performance. Thus, a natural way of
assigning the BRPs to the different partitions is based on their
share of the total controllable prosumption capacity. 
Remark III.6 In contrast to what one might expect, the open-
loop power imbalance ΔPOL(t) attained by APM does not
converge to zero for all t ∈ R if N→∞. This issue is inherent
to establishing PTU-based energy (instead of continuous-time
power) transactions on the market, which can be considered as
sampling the smooth, expected noncontrollable prosumption
proﬁles at a nonuniform sampling rate. This is explained
below.
The mean value theorem states that for continuous, differ-
entiable μP (t), there exists a t∗n ∈ [tn, tn+1) such that
tn+1∫
tn
μP (t)dt = (tn+1 − tn)μP (t∗n) = TPTUμP (t∗n).
In other words, μP (t) takes on its average value P˜ [n] at some
point of the n-th PTU, and thus, all P˜i[n] are (weighted)
samples of μP (t) taken at this unknown time instant t∗n ∈
[tn, tn+1). This corresponds to nonuniform sampling of μP (t)
at an average rate of 1TPTU .
In the literature, many methods are available for recon-
structing nonuniformly, super-Nyquist sampled signals, see,
e.g., [9]. Crucial to these approaches is that the sample
instants t∗n are distinct and known. PTU-based trade does not
satisfy the latter condition. The nonuniform samples Ei[n] are
therefore not sufﬁcient for perfect reconstruction of the power
proﬁle μP (t), and accordingly, the bound on the corresponding
open-loop power imbalance ΔPOL(t) does not converge to 0
as N →∞. 
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Fig. 4. Open-loop power exchange and imbalance proﬁles for N = 3.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The effectiveness of APM is evaluated by comparing it
with synchronous scheduling for different PTU lengths. We
begin with open-loop scheduling performance, followed by a
comparison of closed-loop simulation results.
A. Open-loop performance
The open-loop performance of a TPTU and a TPTUN PTU-
length synchronous settlement scheme are compared with the
performance attained by an evenly-distributed N -sequence
APM scheme with a PTU-length of TPTU. The asynchronous
scheme is simulated for N = 3 and N = 1000, where the latter
scenario provides an indication of the results for N → ∞.
In the simulation, for simplicity, the noncontrollable power
exchange proﬁle μP (t) is assumed to be sinusoidal with a
period of one day.
Fig. 4 shows the open-loop performance of the current
arrangements, that of a synchronous scheme with PTU length
TPTU
3 and that of a 3-sequence asynchronous scheme. The upper
bound on the open-loop error |ΔPOL(t)| for the synchronous
scheme, i.e., (12), is represented by the dashed lines in the
lower subﬁgure. Both the APM and the synchronous scheme
with PTU length TPTU3 decrease the worst-case open-loop
error by a factor of approximately 3. Furthermore, note that
the open-loop error resulting from TPTU3 -PTU scheduling is
0 whenever dμPdt (t) = 0 (for instance, at 06:00h), whereas
a small error is apparent in the asynchronous case, due to
nonzero higher order derivatives in (13).
Fig. 5 shows the simulation results for N = 1000. The
worst-case open-loop error envelope for the N → ∞ APM
settlement scheme, i.e., (13), is shown in the bottom plot.
Although increasing N does not reduce the open-loop APM
error to zero (see Remark III.6), it is possible to get arbitrarily
close to error bound (13) for all t ∈ R by choosing appropriate
N ∈ N+.
Now consider the root mean square imbalance/error crite-
rion e(T ) :=
√∫ T
0
|ΔPOL(t)|2dt. Evaluating this criterion
for a period of one day (T = 86400 s) and N = 3 yields
a 64% and 67% reduction in e(T ) for APM and TPTU3 -based
synchronized settlement, respectively, measured with respect
to the error induced by the standard TPTU-based synchronous
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Fig. 5. Open-loop power exchange and imbalance proﬁles for N = 1000.
scheme. For N = 1000 this reduction is even larger, that is,
85% and 99%, respectively. These ﬁgures show that, even
for relatively small values of N , both the APM-based and
short-PTU schemes can outperform the current arrangements.
However, although APM and PTU-shortening lead to similar
improvement of the open-loop balancing quality, the complex-
ity of their implementation is quite different. In the shortened
PTU case, large N values correspond to small PTU-lengths,
and thus require highly accurate prediction models and many
decisions for trade. This is not the case for the APM scheme,
as the corresponding market is based on a PTU-length of TPTU
for any N ∈ N+.
B. Closed-loop performance
Next, we focus on real-time balancing. Fig. 6 schematically
depicts the simulated 5-BRP benchmark power network. Its
closed-loop performance is evaluated during regular, unper-
turbed operation under the current, synchronized (ENTSO-E)
settling arrangements and for APM with N = 5 and evenly-
distributed energy transactions. All BRPs are described by
a linear, lumped generator model, reproduced from [10] and
schematically shown in Fig. 7. Frequency/imbalance control
is implemented by two parallel feedback loops. The primary
control law is PPC(t) = −RD(Δf(t)), with frequency devi-
ation Δf(t) := f(t) − f0, f0 := 50Hz, and with dead-band
TSO
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Fig. 6. Benchmark power system.
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Fig. 8. Evolution of the closed-loop grid frequency over time.
function
D(x) :=
{
0 for |x| ≤ d
x for |x| > d, (14)
where d ∈ R+ is some operating threshold. Secondary control
power PSC(t) is requested by the TSO through the classical
feedback law PSC(t) = Kp,SCACE(t) + Ki,SC
∫
ACE(t)dt,
where ACE(t) := ΔP (t)+KfΔf(t) is the area control error.
All network parameters, such as the total inertia J , the load-
damping coefﬁcient β, the primary control operating range
d and the gains of the primary and secondary control loops
are taken from [11]. BRP models 0–3 are dimensioned as
(relatively slow) coal-ﬁred generators; BRP 4 is modeled as a
fast-responding gas-fueled power plant. All BRPs have equal
production capacities Pmax.
The closed-loop performance is measured in terms of the
maximum frequency deviation Δfmax := maxt |f(t) − f0|
and the primary and secondary control effort, deﬁned as
Ex(T ) :=
∫ T
0
|Px(t)|dt [GWh], where x can be either “PC” or
“SC” to denote primary or secondary balancing power/energy,
respectively. Table I lists the corresponding performance re-
sults; Fig. 8 depicts the evolution of the grid frequency over
time. Firstly, note that the synchronous settlement result in
Fig. 8 shows a clear resemblance with the actual ENTSO-
E-grid measurements shown in Fig. 2, thus indicating that
the simulation captures the major power system dynamics
well. Secondly, it can be observed that the grid frequency is
stabilized, i.e., is driven back to f0 in case of disturbances,
which, in this scenario, completely originate from the mis-
match between the smooth sinusoidal load proﬁle and the
aggregated step-wise generation schedules. Table I shows that
the daily APM-induced maximum frequency deviations are
smaller than the deviations caused by the synchronous scheme.
Moreover, as the closed-loop power imbalance induced by
asynchronous settlement completely lies within the dead-band
interval [−d, d], APM avoids undesired activation of fast,
primary balancing reserves. Also, the simulation illustrates
that asynchronous scheduling reduces the need for secondary
control energy, due to the corresponding improvement in open-
loop scheduling efﬁciency.
TABLE I
ASSESSMENT OF CLOSED-LOOP PERFORMANCE
Settling method Δfmax [mHz] EPC [GWh] ESC [GWh]
Synchronous 71.8 2.27 6.26
Asynchronous (N = 5) 15.5 0.00 1.64
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the deregulated electrical energy market, network oper-
ators have to provide market participants with appropriate in-
centives to guarantee stable operation of the transmission net-
work. In this paper, it was shown that the currently employed
incentive system does not necessarily induce power exchange
proﬁles that contribute to grid stability, due to the fundamental
inconsistency between energy-based trade and power-related
security objectives. State-of-the-art solutions for tackling this
issue can affect market freedom or signiﬁcantly increase com-
plexity of trade. Therefore, an alternative scheduling concept
was proposed that relies on standard market arrangements,
but settles energy transactions in an asynchronous way. Open-
and closed-loop simulations were provided to illustrate that
by adopting this method, grid operation can become more
robust and the strain on balancing reserves can be reduced
considerably.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (11)
Consider the second scenario in Sect. III, where all control-
lable generation is uniformly distributed over BRPs i ∈ IBRP,
and where BRP 0 is responsible for all noncontrollable pro-
sumption (i.e., μP,i(t) 	= 0 only for i = 0). Let
P [k] := P˜ [n], for n ≤ k
N
< n + 1, k ∈ N, (15)
7be the result of up-sampling P˜ [n] :=
∑
i P˜i[n] with the strictly
positive, integer factor N . Using (8)–(9), (10) is rewritten as
Pˆ [k] =
N−1∑
i=0
1 + 2i
2N2
(
P [k −N + i] + P [k + N − i− 1]
)
. (16)
Thus, Pˆ [k] is a weighted sum of successive samples of
P [k], or, equivalently, the result of convolving P [k] with a
symmetric ﬁnite impulse response hk, k = 0, . . . , 2N − 1.
This impulse response is speciﬁed by the vector
h =
[
h0, h1, . . . hN−1, hN , . . . h2N−2, h2N−1
]
=
1
2N2
[ 1, 1+2, ... 1+2(N−1), 1+2(N−1), ... 1+2, 1 ] . (17)
Given (17), we observe the following. Firstly, note that the
sum of the coefﬁcients of h equals
2N−1∑
k=0
hk = 2 · 1
2N2
(
1 + (1 + 2(N − 1))
2
·N
)
= 1. (18)
This implies that all E-program transactions are contained in
the E-references. Secondly, observe that h describes a 2N -
wide low-pass digital ﬁlter applied to the aggregated controlled
power proﬁle for the power system as a whole, which is
sampled at a rate of NTPTU . Hence, under APM scheduling,
transaction Ei[n] is distributed over 2 PTUs of the market time
frame. Both observations are in accordance with Prop. III.3.
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF PROPOSITION III.4
A. Synchronized settlement
An expression for the open-loop power exchange error asso-
ciated with the currently-employed, TPTU-based synchronous
scheduling arrangements, and an upper bound thereon, is
derived as follows. Let the aggregated step-wise power pro-
sumption proﬁle be described by
P˜ [n] :=
1
TPTU
∫ tn+1
tn
μP (τ)dτ =
E(tn+1)− E(tn)
TPTU
, (19)
where
E(τ) =
∫ τ
0
μP (t)dt + E(0) ⇔ E′(τ) = μP (τ). (20)
Assuming that E(τ) is inﬁnitely differentiable for all τ ∈ R,
its Taylor series representation around t ∈ [tn, tn+1) is
E(τ) = E(t) + E′(t)(τ − t) + E
′′(t)
2
(τ − t)2 +O((τ − t)3),
see, e.g., [12]. From this, it follows that
E(tn) = E(t) + E
′(t)(tn − t) + E
′′(t)
2
(tn − t)2 +O((tn − t)3)
E(tn+1) = E(t) + E
′(t)(tn+1 − t)
+
E′′(t)
2
(tn+1 − t)2 +O((tn+1 − t)3).
By combining tn := nTPTU, tn+1 := (n + 1)TPTU, (20) and
the above expressions for En and En+1, (19) is rewritten as
P˜ [n] = μP (t)− 1
2
(
(2n + 1)TPTU − 2t
)
μ′P (t)
+
1
6
(
(1 + 3n + 3n2)T 2PTU − 3t(2n + 1)TPTU + 3t2
)
μ′′P (t)
+O(T 3PTU). (21)
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Fig. 9. Impulse response of APM ﬁlter h for N →∞ (TPTU
N
→ 0).
Introducing t∗ := t− tn ∈ [0, TPTU) yields
P˜ [n] = μP (t)− 1
2
(
TPTU − 2t∗
)
μ′P (t)
+
1
6
(
T 2PTU − 3t∗TPTU + 3(t∗)2
)
μ′′P (t) +O(T 3PTU). (22)
Hence, it follows that the open-loop error ΔPOL(t) := P˜ [n]−
μP (t) for t ∈ [tn, tn+1) is given by
ΔPOL(t) = −1
2
(
TPTU − 2t∗
)
μ′P (t) (23)
+
1
6
(
T 2PTU − 3t∗TPTU + 3(t∗)2
)
μ′′P (t) +O(T 3PTU).
Now, the upper bound on |ΔPOL(t)|, i.e., (12), follows by
recalling the triangle and Cauchy-Schwarz inequalities, and
the fact that t∗ := t− tn ∈ [0, TPTU):∣∣ΔPOL(t)∣∣ ≤ 1
2
∣∣TPTU − 2t∗∣∣∣∣μ′P (t)∣∣
+
1
6
∣∣T 2PTU − 3t∗TPTU + 3(t∗)2∣∣∣∣μ′′P (t)∣∣+O(T 3PTU)
≤ TPTU
2
∣∣μ′P (t)∣∣+ T 2PTU
6
∣∣μ′′P (t)∣∣+O(T 3PTU). (24)
B. Evenly-distributed APM
For N → ∞ and evenly distributed controllable genera-
tion/load, the expression for ΔPOL(t) under APM is derived
as follows. In Appendix A, it was shown that Pˆ [k] is the result
of convolving P [k] with discrete-time impulse response hk.
Fig. 9 shows that for N → ∞/inﬁnitesimally small sampling
period TPTUN , this impulse response is triangular with width
2TPTU and height 1TPTU (such that (18) holds). Accordingly, it
is possible to express Pˆ (t) for t ∈ [tn, tn+1) as a weighted
sum of P˜ [n− 1], P˜ [n] and P˜ [n + 1], i.e.,
Pˆ (t) = w1(t)P˜ [n− 1] + w2(t)P˜ [n] + w3(t)P˜ [n + 1], (25)
for t ∈ [tn, tn+1), with
w1(t) :=
1
2
(
TPTU − t∗
TPTU
)2
, w2(t) :=
3
4
−
(
1
2
− TPTU − t
∗
TPTU
)2
,
w3(t) :=
1
2
(
t∗
TPTU
)2
.
Combining (21) and (25) yields
Pˆ (t) = μP (t) +
T 2PTU
6
μ′′P (t) +O(T 3PTU), (27)
such that the open-loop error ΔPOL(t) is given by
ΔPOL(t) = Pˆ (t)− μP (t) = T
2
PTU
6
μ′′P (t) +O(T 3PTU). (28)
Now, the upper bound on |ΔPOL(t)|, i.e., (13), follows:∣∣∣∣ΔPOL(t)∣∣∣∣ ≤ T 2PTU6
∣∣∣∣μ′′P (t)∣∣∣∣+O(T 3PTU). (29)
